



Respect for the rule of law as embedded in Article 2 TEU 









The defence of common values, and of the rule of law in particular, has become an issue 
of major concern for EU institutions. The emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic 
brought the EU to adopt a wide-ranging package of financial aids. Within this package, 
the hypothesis of linking the disbursement of EU funds to the respect for the rule of law 
in the Member States re-emerged. Rule of law deficiencies, indeed, are believed to 
disrupt the very functioning of the Union’s legal order, based as it is on mutual legal 
interdependence and mutual trust among its Members. 
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It is widely held among scholars that the defence of the ‘common values’, and 
of the rule of law in particular, as embedded in Article 2 TEU, is not adequately 
pursued by the EU institutions vis-à-vis what has been called «the purposeful 
destruction of the rule of law inside EU Member States»1, starting from Hungary 
and Poland.  
Measures laid down in Article 7 TEU give national governments, as 
represented in the Council (‘alert procedure’) or in the European Council (‘nuclear 
option’), the task of protecting ‘common values’ from violations perpetrated by a 
Member State within its own jurisdiction. For some scholars, it is precisely for 
this reason that Article 7 has not served the purpose for which it was conceived, 
since it leaves the defence of values which should not be subject to negotiation up 
for political bargain.  
It is true that the Article 7 mechanism is deemed to be complementary to the 
classic infringement procedure provided for by Article 258 TFEU for the purpose 
of defending those values, and that some steps have recently been taken in that 
direction. Overall, the reluctance of European political rulers to confront the 
challenge of the breach of common values results however clearly, and it is likely 
to endanger the endurance of EU constitutionalism. Some commentators even 
believe that, as the EU left Hungarian Prime Minister to develop into an autocrat 
during the last decade, it is now too late for a radical turnaround – which an 
intergovernmental solution would provide. 
Against such background, attention should be driven to the recent EU attempts 
at circumventing the current stalemate affecting the enforcement of Article 7 
TEU, by linking the disbursement of EU budget funds, or of cohesion funds, to 
the respect for the rule of law in the Member States. A 2017 Commission 
document concerning the reform of EU budget already held that: 
 
«Upholding EU core values when developing and implementing EU policies is 
key. There have been new suggestions in the public debate to link the disbursement 
of EU budget funds to the state of the rule of law in Member States. Respect for the 
rule of law is important for European citizens, but also for business initiatives, 
innovation and investment, which will flourish most where the legal and 
institutional framework adheres fully to the common values of the Union. There is 
hence a clear relationship between the rule of law and an efficient implementation 
of the private and public investments supported by the EU budget»2. 
 
On the other hand, the ‘new suggestions’ that the Commission seemed then to 
endorse would launch a conditionality mechanism in an unexplored field, that of 
the rule of law crisis. Conditionality would then exert a different function from 
that of its macroeconomic version, which was deemed crucial in order to contrast 
the Eurozone financial crisis in the last decade.  
 
1 J.-W. Müller, Reflections on Europe’s ‘Rule of Law Crises’, in P.F. Kjaer, N. Olson (eds.), Critical 
Theories of Crisis in Europe. From Weimar to the Euro, Rowman & Littlefield, London, 2016, p. 162.  
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Furthermore, in its 2018 proposal to protect the Union’s budget in the case of 
generalised deficiencies regarding the rule of law in the Member States, the 
European Commission refers to deficiencies in the administration of justice that 
«affect or risk affecting the principles of sound financial management or the 
protection of the financial interests of the Union» (Art 3.1).  
Two years later, the emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic brought 
the EU to adopt a wide-ranging package, which combines the future Multiannual 
Financial Framework (MFF) and a specific Recovery effort under Next 
Generation EU (NGEU). Within this package, the hypothesis of linking the 
disbursement of EU budget funds to the respect for the rule of law in the Member 
States re-emerged.  
In the European Council’s Conclusions of 21 July 2020, it was stated in this 
respect (A24) that: 
 
 «The Union’s financial interests shall be protected in accordance with the 
general principles embedded in the Union Treaties, in particular the values of 
Article 2 TEU. The European Council underlines the importance of the protection 
of the Union’s financial interests. The European Council underlines the importance 
of the respect of the rule of law». 
 
The wording was meant to put the Union’s financial interests on an equal 
footing to the rule of law, in spite of Article 2 TEU.  
However, such approach appeared too cautious to the European Parliament. On 
23 July 2020, the EP Resolution affirmed:  
 
«The EP [...] strongly regrets the fact that the European Council significantly 
weakened the efforts of the Commission and Parliament to uphold the rule of law, 
fundamental rights and democracy in the framework of the MFF and the Next 
Generation EU (NGEU) instrument; reconfirms its demand to complete the co-
legislator’s work on the Commission’s proposed mechanism to protect the EU 
budget where there is a systemic threat to the values enshrined in Article 2 of the 
TEU, and where the financial interests of the Union are at stake; stresses that, to be 
effective, this mechanism should be activated by a reverse qualified majority; 
underlines that this mechanism must not affect the obligation of government 
entities or of Member States to make payments to final beneficiaries or recipients; 
underlines that the Rule of Law Regulation will be adopted by co-decision». 
  
This statement forced the Council to change its plans, and to negotiate an 
agreement with the EP. Meanwhile, on 30th September 2020, the European 
Commission published the first annual rule of law report, which monitors both 
positive and negative developments relating to the rule of law in all Member 
States. «Serious concern» was there raised for how judicial independence was 
ensured both in Hungary and in Poland, adding that, for the former, judicial 
independence was one of the issues raised in the Article 7 procedure initiated by 
the EP, and that Poland’s justice reforms of 2015 led the Commission to launch 
the same procedure, which is still being considered by the Council.      
In a plenary debate on 5th October 2020, MEPs welcomed the annual rule of 
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monitoring alone would not bring back judicial independence in Poland or in 
Hungary.  
On 5th November 2020, Parliament negotiators reached a provisional 
agreement with the Council Presidency on a legislation establishing a mechanism 
that would allow the suspension of budget payments to a Member State who 
violated the rule of law, ensuring that it would not only apply to cases of 
corruption and fraud, but that it would also cover breaches of fundamental values 
such as freedom, democracy, equality and respect for human rights, including the 
rights of minorities.  
The decision on the suspension will have to be made by the Council on the 
proposal of the European Commission. Nonetheless, this procedure cannot be 
referred to the rules of the EU budget, like those of the NGEU, since they need to 
be approved unanimously. Hence the Hungarian and Polish governments’ threat 
of vetoing the NGEU’s approval, despite the fact that these two countries would 
be among the main beneficiaries of the NGEU funding.  
For the moment, we do not know whether such blackmail will once again 
succeed. What we might examine is the feasibility of the new mechanism3.   
According to some commentators, linking the budget to the rule of law 
conditionality would create a paradox, whereby a national government’s 
infringement of the rule of law would come at the expense of its most 
disadvantaged citizens4. But the agreement reached between the EP and the 
Council takes into account such an objection, by relying on an EP resolution of 
April 2019, which required that Member States execute MFF projects even if they 
have not received the corresponding transfers from the EU budget due to a rule of 
law breach.  
It is further argued that, rather than linking the budget to the respect for the rule 
of law, it might be useful to reinforce existing instruments such as the European 
Public Prosecutor Office (EPPO), which can investigate, prosecute, and bring to 
judgment such crimes against the EU budget as fraud, corruption or serious cross-
border VAT fraud5.  
This approach neglects the crucial point of the issue. The damages which some 
Member States might provide to the EU’s financial interest are relevant for the 
issue only to the extent that they have been committed by violating the values 
mentioned in Article 2 TEU, namely, those that the Treaty of the Union presumes 
to be «common to the Member States», and on which, as it solemnly states, «the 
Union is founded». Therefore, a Member State contravening such values would 
endanger the legitimacy of EU decision-making as a whole, and possibly question 
the lawfulness of subsequent EU decisions. Rule of law deficiencies are believed 
to disrupt the very functioning of the Union legal order, based as it is on mutual 
legal interdependence and mutual trust among its members6.  
 
3 The essay has been submitted to this Journal in December 2020.  
4 D. Gros, S. Blockmans, F. Corti, Rule of Law and the Next Generation EU Recovery, in CEPS, 15 
October 2020, https://www.ceps.eu/rule-of-law-and-the-next-generation-eu-recovery/.  
5 Ibidem.  
6 See C. Hillion, Overseeing the Rule of Law in the European Union. Legal Mandate and Means, in 





Nuovi Autoritarismi e Democrazie:  
Diritto, Istituzioni, Società  
 
n. 1/2021 ISSN 2612-6672 | DOI 10.13130/2612-6672/15825 | 101  
 
It is also objected that judiciary independence, whose violation lies at the core 
of the alleged charges to the Hungarian and Polish governments, is far from 
exhausting the sense of the rule of law. The objection is per se correct, but it 
neglects that ideologies seeking to destroy EU basic values  
 
«[...] are now quite entrenched, making ‘autocratic legalism’ a strategy for 
dealing with EU law itself. No longer are rule of law issues temporary and isolated 
deviations from a norm of compliance, which had been presumed. Instead, non-
compliance with European values has become a principled ideological choice of 
several governments»7. 
  
Recent circumstances have confirmed this perspective. The deep controversy 
raised by the agreement that aimed at introducing the rule of law conditionality 
reveals that the EU is confronted with a constitutional challenge that goes far 
beyond a single government’s expediency. 
 
7 K.L. Scheppele, D.V. Kochenov, B.Grawoska-Moroz, EU Values are Law after All. Enforcing EU 
Values through Systemic Infringement Actions by the European Commission and the Member States of 
the European Union, in Yearbook of European Law, Vol. 39, 2020, pp. 3-121. 
